In the context of wide-scale impunity and the alleged collusion of state functionaries in systemic criminal conduct, robust participation of foreign personnel in trials is a necessary starting point to redeeming the trust of victims in the state, and ensuring the confidence and participation of all stakeholders in Sri Lankan transitional justice processes. … We also recognize the expertise and skills required to investigate and prosecute serious abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law, and note the vacuum in this regard within Sri Lanka. 
Background
A number of states emerging from periods of armed conflict or mass violence have created national institutions dedicated to prosecuting international crimes and invited the involvement of international experts in various capacities. Included within these internationalized institutions are special chambers and investigative units that are deeply ensconced within the relevant domestic system but that benefit from international support and expertise through seconded personnel and the provision of technical assistance. These institutions have been called "hybrid" or "mixed" tribunals simply because they possess qualities of both domestic and international courts. 8 For example, past models have been staffed by international and domestic personnel (judges, prosecutors, investigators, defense counsel, administrators, and support staff) working in tandem with their local counterparts and have applied a mixture of international and domestic criminal law and procedures. 9 The involvement of local personnel has been crucial to the success of these efforts, from the perspective of perceived domestic legitimacy, technology and knowledge transfer, and cultural and legal literacy.
The rationales for internationalizing elements of the domestic judicial system in the wake of mass violence are multi-fold. Most importantly, the inclusion of international personnel serves to restore legitimacy and popular faith in domestic institutions that may have suffered a loss of confidence in the eyes of victim groups and perpetrators. 10 Indeed, many victims and human rights advocates see the judicial sector as having been blind to, or even complicit in, the crimes of the state during the war, including through a biased application of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
11 Mixed institutions may be better equipped to advance the rule of law in keeping with international principles and to protect against over-zealous, one-sided, or unfair prosecutions. Transitional societies often must deal with a wealth of legal claims, including property and , available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/SriLanka.aspx#sthash.OZ8dfyMU.dpuf ("'The levels of mistrust in State authorities and institutions by broad segments of Sri Lankan society should not be underestimated,' the High Commissioner said. 'It is for this reason that the establishment of a hybrid special court, integrating international judges, prosecutors, lawyers and investigators, is so essential. A purely domestic court procedure will have no chance of overcoming widespread and justifiable suspicions fueled by decades of violations, malpractice and broken promises.'"). 11 See Basil Fernando, Sense and Nonsense on Judicial Matters, Asian Human Rights Commission (2 October 2015), http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-168-2015; Statement by United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein at the End of his Mission to Sri Lanka, U.N. Doc. HC/16/13 (9 February 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17025&LangID=E ("Sri Lanka has many excellent judges, lawyers, and law enforcement officials. But over the years the system they depended on, and which depends on them, became highly politicised, unbalanced, unreliable.") probate issues; as such, there are practical advantages to relying on a cadre of foreign experts with experience investigating and prosecuting cases involving international crimes (and defending against such charges). Integrating international experts may also allow these institutions to operate more economically, because such personnel are often seconded from their home systems and compensated from foreign or international coffers. These experts-who should be identified by way of a rigorous selection process-bring experience investigating and prosecuting complex crimes, enabling the domestic system to begin operations more quickly and to magnify its impact. Attention should be paid to gender and ethnic parity and to appointing personnel with experience in international criminal law, human rights, and gender. 12 In addition to being chosen for their expertise, individuals should be known internationally for their professionalism, humility, adaptability, impartiality, and integrity. 13 For judicial processes to contribute to reconciliation and to respond to felt needs for justice, it is vitally important that all stakeholders have faith in the integrity and fairness of both the process and the actors involved.
14 The concept of the hybrid or mixed tribunal emerged as a response to perceived shortcomings of prior efforts at international justice that necessitated the extensive involvement of the international community working through the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly, and/or Secretary General. As it turned out, these standalone international, or quasiinternational institutions, were slow to reach their stride and proved to be quite expensive in terms of start-up and maintenance expenses. Many were located far from the events in question, which hindered their accessibility, undermined local ownership within the constituencies they were designed to serve, and limited the degree of technology and knowledge transfer available to help rebuild or strengthen national judicial systems. As compared to these predecessors, some of the more recent hybrid institutions have proven to be more agile in operation, better anchored in local and even regional norms, and more attuned to "the complex domestic and social causes that led to the crimes" in the first place.
15 They are usually designed and stood up following "a collaborative process between the post-conflict state and the international community, and can be tailored to best suit each individual conflict."
16 As such, hybrid entities have the potential to enjoy greater cultural and procedural legitimacy than either purely domestic or fully international institutions.
There are many ways to internationalize an otherwise domestic accountability mechanism. All told, a number of key decisions must be made. In terms of staffing, tribunal architects must determine how to appoint domestic and international staff positions and in what ratio. If panels of judges are contemplated, ensuring a majority of internationals generally lends legitimacy to the process and potentially enhances the fairness of proceedings, assuming that the international personnel are of high quality. Such personnel can be phased out over time as domestic capacity for addressing these complex crimes develops. single judges, it is possible to appoint foreign judicial advisers, professional clerks, or greffiers to inject international expertise into the adjudicative process. A more comprehensive plan to integrate foreign experts into prosecution and defense offices as well as the courts' administrative body will ensure that all elements of the process enjoy an infusion of international expertise. Although states often want their nationals to occupy top posts in hybrid institutions, international personnel may be better positioned to withstand domestic political pressures, particularly during the early phase of a justice process.
17 They may also be less vulnerable to security threats. At the same time, many states may resist the inclusion of foreign personnel in certain posts; resort to experts drawn from the country's diaspora or from partner states in regional or political organizations may mitigate these concerns. 18 In any case, domestic legislation and changes to local bar rules may be required to enable foreign personnel to occupy certain positions although some Commonwealth states (such as the Seychelles) grant reciprocal rights to lawyers hailing from other Commonwealth jurisdictions. The interoperability of Commonwealth judges could prove to be useful as the actors consider accountability options for Sri Lanka, as anticipated by the Human Rights Council.
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Models for Integrating International Personnel
International, internationalized, and hybrid justice mechanisms have been created through a number of different legal routes. 20 That said, it is anticipated that any accountability mechanism in Sri Lanka will be the product of domestic legislation, although this may be accompanied by a bilateral treaty with some element of the United Nations to address staffing, funding, or legal issues, such as the definition of actionable crimes. 21 Recent research confirms that notwithstanding recent protests to the contrary, 22 there is no constitutional or statutory impediment to creating or specialized chambers in Sri Lanka or staffing them with international experts. In particular, it has been observed that a fully functional hybrid court could be structured within Sri Lanka's legal system in a way that is entirely compatible with the existing constitution. package passed by a simple majority of Parliament along with incidental regulatory changes could establish a uniquely Sri Lankan hybrid mode.
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A number of different systems in other post-conflict states provide exemplars for the process underway in Sri Lanka. Some of these involved the creation of a standalone domestic tribunal with dedicated staff, an autonomous appellate body, and bespoke rules; 24 by contrast, other states embedded special chambers within, or sprinkled international personnel throughout, the extant domestic penal system. The latter models inevitably inherit or reflect elements of the underlying system, subject to occasional adjustments. 25 By contrast, autonomous ad hoc tribunals that enjoy a separate legal personality have been the subject of greater structural and procedural innovation. The creation of a stand-alone institution also cabins international involvement to certain cases, although there may be benefits to having international personnel participate in the adjudication of a broader range of matters as part of the ordinary court system, including other complex or politically sensitive cases dealing with terrorism, corruption, or organized crime. 26 A less centralized approach avoids the creation of a two-tiered justice system, enables more interactions between local and international personnel, and may increase the impact of hybridity on the system as a whole. That said, a more integrated model may be less appealing in situations, such as Sri Lanka, where there is resistance to admitting foreign personnel.
An early and under-explored example of embedding international expertise into a domestic process for the purpose of enhancing judicial capacity and procedural legitimacy is found in the 1981 trials of would-be coup leaders in the Gambia. 27 This effort traces its provenance to a coup staged by local actors that was rumored to be part of a Pan-African Marxist conspiracy spearheaded by Muammar Gaddafi-a theory that was later debunked. 28 In response, the Gambia invoked a mutual defense pact with Senegal, whose troops helped to quickly oust the rebels. Thousands of people were detained in connection with the uprising. Fearing that key members of the government and judiciary had been somehow involved in the coup attempt, the Gambia established special tribunals staffed by lawyers and judges from the Commonwealth 23 See South Asia Centre for Legal Studies, Rhadeena de Alwis & Niran Ankatell, A Hybrid Court: Ideas for Sri Lanka 2 (2015); Fonseka and Ganeshathasan, Ibid note 7, at 5-9 (concluding that there are no constitutional bars to the participation of foreign nationals in the judicial process). 24 The War Crime Chambers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, were independent of the domestic judicial system and contained their own dedicated appellate panels. association of states-including British subject Sir Desmond Da Silva 29 who was an expert on the 1351 English Treason Act and went on to serve as Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone-to assess the legality of the detentions and prosecute those who were deemed most responsible. All told, 45 people were tried in 4 years. Also involved were Hassan Jallow (the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Mechanism on International Tribunals) and Fatou Bensouda (now the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC)), who were young professionals working in the judicial system at the time. 30 A similar arrangement was implemented in the former Yugoslavia to complement the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sitting in The Hague. Once it became clear that the ICTY would not be able to manage all, or even a solid percentage, of war crimes cases generated by the dissolution of Yugoslavia, policymakers in the newly independent states began to consider local options. Eventually, special war crimes chambers were established in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia. 31 The system in BiH was composed of a War Crimes Chamber (WCC) and a Special Department for War Crimes in the Prosecutor's Office. 32 The WCC heard cases referred from the ICTY as well as cases resulting from the prosecutors' own investigations. The WCC legislation allowed for the injection of international staff-administrators (including the Registrar), judges at the trial and appellate levels, and prosecutors working alongside national staff-who were gradually phased out over the years. 33 The President and Chief Prosecutor, however, were always Bosnian nationals. Controversially, there were no prospects for the provision of international defense counsel. 34 Internationals were paid out of a pool of donor funds. The ICTY, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Human Rights Violators Unit, and other outside organizations provided professional advice and technical assistance to various elements of the WCC, particularly when it came to the reform of national legislation and the training of staff, defense counsel, and judges. 35 The WCC, which have become a permanent addition to the court system, continue to receive international support but are largely self-sufficient.
Following post-referendum violence in East Timor, the United Nations launched the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), a peacekeeping operation organized to exercise Timorese legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice, during the fledgling country's transition to self-government. 36 Early UNTAET regulations created both an ordinary court system and a system of Special Panels to address the commission of international crimes. 37 The UNTAET administrator appointed the Special Panel judges upon the recommendation of a mixed Timorese-foreign commission, which enabled local input into staffing. 38 It was envisioned that the Dili District Court would house several Special Panels, but hiring delays meant that it took years to establish a second panel. 39 The Court of Appeals, which included two international judges, was to assert jurisdiction over appeals from ordinary panels in the District Court in addition to Special Panel cases. 40 Other international positions within Timor-Leste's Special Panels were identified through standard U.N. recruitment processes for peacekeeping missions, 41 which contributed to delays because such missions do not often contain a judicial component. Staffing the Special Panels remained a challenge given the lack of qualified international candidates for what amounted to a hardship post and the weak domestic capacity. In these institutions, delays in the appointment of personnel, and especially international judges who were subject to U.N. hiring procedures, slowed the judicial proceedings and left many appeals pending.
42 Such delays could easily be avoided for institutions not governed by the at-times cumbersome U.N. hiring process.
The structure of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is unique and, in certain notable respects, not worthy of emulation. In particular, every key position at the ECCC is shared by a Cambodian and an international appointee. So, there are CoInvestigating Judges (CIJs), Co-Prosecutors (CPs), Co-Civil Party Representatives, etc.; even the Office of Administration is bifurcated into two distinct components that service the national and international "sides" of the ECCC. Coordination and communication problems abound. Unlike the other ad hoc tribunals, the ECCC also includes a Pre-Trial Chamber that is supposed to resolve conflicts between the CIJs and CPs during the investigation stage and hear "appeals" against CIJ orders.
43 The PTC's rulings, however, are not binding or subject to an appeal; as a 44 In principle, this arrangement respects the prevailing legal architecture more than a common-law style process would have given Cambodia's civil law tradition, but in practice, it has resulted in repetitive proceedings at every step along the way. 45 Cambodian negotiators also succeeded in ensuring that each Chamber has a majority of Cambodian judges; however, a super-majority is necessary to render any important ruling. 46 As such, the tribunal is considered only as strong as its weakest international judge. A longstanding dispute between the CPs and CIJs over whether to move forward with charges in Cases 003 and 004 has led to pointed criticism that the government is interfering in the judicial process and the Cambodian personnel are failing to fulfill their mandate. 47 Multiple international CIJs have resigned amidst complaints that they had either been "captured" by the Cambodian side or prevented from functioning independently. 48 At the moment, these cases are proceeding without the blessing of the Cambodian CIJ or CP because the PTC did not achieve the super-majority required to halt the investigation. 49 Wisely, no other hybrid court has adopted this strict hybrid formula for staffing.
The Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC), established by the African Union in Senegal to prosecute Hissène Habré of Chad and several of his confederates, are minimally international: they are staffed by a sprinkling of international judges (who do not comprise a majority) applying international criminal law and domestic procedural law. 50 Although technically comprising an international court, the EAC exists within the ordinary Senegalese district and appeals court structure in Dakar. In keeping with local law, there are four chambers: an investigative chamber, an indicting chamber, a trial chamber, and an appeals chamber. 51 The presiding judges of the latter two chambers hail from another AU member state. 52 Individuals are nominated by the Senegalese Justice Minister and appointed by the African Union Commission Chair, although there is no requirement that they be experts in international criminal law as has been required for other international and internationalized tribunals. 53 Union wisely established an independent Defense Office to protect the rights of the defense and otherwise support defense counsel. 54 The EAC offer a minimally hybrid model, but one that will still benefit from international expertise in prosecuting complex international crimes.
The latest effort in this tradition is found in the nascent Special Criminal Court (SCC) for the Central African Republic (CAR). 55 The SCC is the product of newly-passed legislation, 56 which follows on the heels of a U.N. commission of inquiry recommendation, 57 an August 2014 agreement between CAR and the United Nations that contemplates the establishment of the SCC, 58 and a Special Investigation Cell formed by presidential decree to begin investigations.
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The legislation envisions a mixed bench composed of international and domestic judges in roughly equal numbers. 60 The Prosecutor will be a foreign national, but the Chief Justice will hail from CAR. 61 It is anticipated that the SCC will be in existence for 5 years, subject to renewal at the initiative of the government in consultation with the United Nations. 62 The SCC's jurisdiction will overlap with that of the ICC, which is undertaking investigations into two sets of international crimes, including crimes committed since 2012 by the Séléka Alliance and their anti-Balaka foes that will be heard by the SCC.
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The DRC offers a microcosm of internationalized justice mechanisms. According to one long-standing proposal, 64 draft legislation would create specialized mixed chambers with highest judicial offices. They shall be independent in the performance of their functions, and shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any other source. … In the overall composition of the Chambers, due account shall be taken of the experience of the judges in international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, criminal law and juvenile justice."). jurisdiction over the range of international crimes. 65 Although this proposal remains in flux, the basic structure involves three five-member Trial Chambers (including two foreign advisor judges) and one five-person Appeals Chamber. These special chambers would be housed within provincial appeals courts and staffed with a mix of national and international personnel, including judges, prosecutors, administrators, investigators, and defense counsel. A special mixed chamber in the national Cour de Cassation would be empowered to review judgments from the Appeals Chamber, which will be co-located in Kinshasa. 66 Investigative and Prosecutorial Units for each Chamber will be made up of a blend of foreign and Congolese staff appointed by the President and other officials. 67 Nationals of states that border the DRC would be excluded from consideration given the involvement of neighboring states in perpetrating and perpetuating the violence. Military and police defendants would be entitled to have career military magistrates serve on their panels, a preference of the Ministry of Defense and a function of Congolese military law, which incorporates the international crimes and vests jurisdiction in military courts during a state of war. Military courts in the DRC have amassed ten years' worth of experience prosecuting international crimes arising out of the various armed conflicts within the country. In this way, the DRC tribunals would be mixed/mixed, incorporating domestic and international elements as well as civilian and military personnel. Under current proposals, international judges would be in the minority of each panel and would gradually be phased out. 68 Another important innovation in the DRC is found in the mobile courts that were developed to bring justice to remote areas in eastern DRC that have been ravaged by war but are far from any formal justice institutions. 69 These courts are creatures of domestic law and come in both civilian and military varieties. They rely heavily on international assistance. In particular, the United Nations Development Program, 70 and transportation for witnesses (which diminishes adjournment rates), and offer pro bono legal assistance to victims and defendants. The mobile courts, which also work with the U.N. Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) and other partners, offer a high degree of local access and ownership while helping to build legal capacity. MONUSCO also provides transportation and, in partnership with the Congolese authorities, security. The mobile courts coordinate with legal clinics to ensure cases are trial-ready; provide appropriate referrals to non-legal organizations that can provide medical, social, and economic assistance to victims; and engage in community education and outreach. 72 So far, evaluations of the mobile courts have been cautiously optimistic, although their dependency on international funding hampers sustainability, and concerns about victim and witness protection persist. 73 As an alternative to the creation of a stand-alone tribunal, specialized court, or mixed judicial chambers, states have also sought assistance from the United Nations and donor countries to strengthen domestic investigative and prosecutorial authorities through a range of rule-of-law initiatives that include the secondment of international experts to dedicated international crimes units. The Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), 74 for example, embeds international experts in the Guatemalan Attorney General's office and the National Police to help investigate and disband criminal organizations with ties to the security forces and other corrupt state structures that are threatening the enjoyment of human rights in Guatemala. 75 CICIG has its origins in civil society demands and a 2002 request from the Government of Guatemala to the United Nations for assistance in dealing with the high levels of postwar violence and entrenched impunity. 76 The U.N. Department of Political Affairs originally proposed a hybrid commission that would enjoy both investigative and prosecutorial powers (to be called the Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations (CICIACS)). 77 The Guatemalan Constitutional Court in a consultative opinion raised concerns that such a delegation of prosecutorial authority might be unconstitutional, attesting to the importance of sorting such legal issues out in advance. 78 Accordingly, the final bilateral agreement between Guatemala and the United Nations established special investigative cells of embedded international experts who provide technical assistance to local actors and undertake direct investigations. 79 Although dependent on Guatemalan officials to pursue charges, CICIG is entitled to present potential criminal charges to the Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) and join proceedings as a private prosecutor (querellante adhesivo). 80 It can also seek sanctions against Guatemalan officials who hinder ongoing investigations or prosecutions. 81 On a structural level, CICIG has been instrumental in proposing legal reforms (including the establishment of a witness protection program), capacitating domestic actors, and establishing a merit-based judicial appointment system. In this way, CICIG's contributions go beyond the provision of technical assistance to investigations and prosecutions. 82 There may also be a role for the United Nations to provide assistance and advice on foreign appointments, even for a purely domestic institution. For example, a majority of the judges and the Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone were appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General; the Government of Sierra Leone appointed the others as well as a Sierra Leonean Deputy Prosecutor. 83 In actuality, there were very few Sierra Leoneans in professional positions at first given the lack of local capacity. This asymmetry was accentuated by the fact that the government appointed some internationals to fill posts that were designated for local personnel. 84 In the early days, and notwithstanding this multilateral appointment process, many top posts went to lawyers from the United States, which was a major supporter-financial and otherwise-of the SCSL. 85 This did raise some concerns that the United States might exert undue influence over the tribunal.
Likewise, in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the international prosecutor, head of the Defense Office, and all the judges have been appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General; the judges were chosen from among those recommended by the Lebanese government and member states. 86 Under the U.N. Agreement with Cambodia, the Supreme Council of the Magistracy selected the Cambodian judges from amongst the local judicial ranks, with mixed results in terms of skill and capacity. 87 The U.N. Secretary-General nominated potential international judges, but these too were subject to approval by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, which drew criticism for trying to manipulate the process through unjustified delays. 88 Whatever the role of the international community in helping to staff mixed courts, the process should involve consultations with key national stakeholders, be based upon rigorous standards in terms of subject matter expertise and experience with other successful transitional justice efforts (international or domestic), and avoid the appearance of excessive influence by any one entity, local or foreign. 89 
Potential Pitfalls
Despite their advantages over earlier models of international justice, these newer hybrid and internationalized institutions raise questions of their own when it comes to the imperatives of legitimacy, competency, and fairness, particularly when local personnel may be susceptible to political manipulation, where the rule of law is not fully established, or when domestic actors insist on certain concessions, such as the availability of in absentia proceedings or the death penalty. Moreover, as they become more idiosyncratic, these institutions risk undermining the universalist ethos that undergirds the entire human rights edifice. Likewise, legitimacy and efficiency deficits have plagued excessively hybridized institutions, such as the ECCC, as compared to the Bosnia-Herzegovina model, which pairs international and local personnel operating under international standards of due process. As Sri Lankan actors embark upon their own efforts at institution building, they should not lose sight of these potential pitfalls.
At the same time, leaving the prosecution of international crimes entirely to domestic systems can enable parochial forms of victor's justice and give expression to illiberal impulses that the international community should not endorse through the provision of financial, technical, diplomatic, or other forms of support. For example, although international advisors played a role in the work of the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), that justice process remained controversial. 90 The IHT was by all measures a domestic court-staffed by Iraqi personnel applying Iraqi law-that was internationalized by the presence of international advisors selected by the International Bar Association and others and by the training and administrative support provided by the U.S. Department of Justice's Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO). 91 Although the Coalition Provision Authority and the original Statute envisioned the appointment of non-Iraqi judges, this did not come to pass. 92 Instead, foreign lawyers (mostly from the United States) were relegated to an advisory role. 93 The pool of qualified advisors was limited, however, by the fact that the U.N. Secretary-General prohibited senior personnel from the ad hoc tribunals to participate in any training programs given the controversy around the legality of the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation. 94 The availability of the death penalty was also an impediment to direct U.N. involvement. As an exercise of lustration, Article 33 of the IHT Statute prohibited the appointment of anyone who had been a member of the Ba'ath party, which may have "dilute [d] the pool of qualified jurists significantly." 95 The IHT was plagued by allegations of political interference (on the part of the new Iraqi authorities and the United States) as well as threats to judges and defense counsel. 96 In part due to its controversial origins and in part due to perceived procedural flaws, the IHT never earned the support, or respect, of the international community. 97 In the absence of international assistance and involvement, domestic criminal prosecutions can become coopted by political forces in ways that undermine the laudable goals sought to be achieved. Nowhere is this more in evidence than in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal (BICT) is "international" in name and subject matter only. Tracing its roots to the War of Liberation that gave rise to modern-day Bangladesh, the BICT is dedicated to prosecuting alleged collaborators with the Pakistani Army (then West Pakistan) for atrocities committed when East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) sought to secede in March 1971. 98 A creature of domestic law with virtually no international involvement, the BICT is asserting jurisdiction over acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and "other crimes under international law" pursuant to a law that dates from the independence period. 99 The Bangladeshi government has barred, or erected impenetrable barriers to, the involvement of any international personnel, including defense counsel chosen by the accused to represent them and advisors who might have positively influenced the proceedings.
truth-telling exercises and the formation of an accurate collective memory; the rehabilitation and reparation of victims; the promotion of reconciliation among communities; an accounting for missing persons; and the development of new institutions and policies. 104 By launching a genuine transitional process, Sri Lanka will make a demonstrable international commitment to the rule of law and to universal principles of justice.
